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ABSTRACT
To ascertain whether terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in 
their pre-attack activities this study fi rst divides the terrorists’ pre-attack 
activities into nine phases: networking, training, general planning, 
attack-specifi c recruitment, fi nancing, operational planning, weapons 
procurement, logistical preparation, and operational preparation. With 
these phases in mind, we then examine a range of terrorism events 
and identify when each of these phases occurred. We have found that 
the cases follow a general pattern, yet there are outliers to the pattern. 
In general, however, the phases we identifi ed do seem to represent a 
necessary order. Some broad plan, along with networking and general 
training occur usually more than a year before an attack and are 
necessary before recruiting and fi nancing can occur, which usually 
happens between six months and a year before an attack. Finally, 
operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation, and 
operational preparation occur closest to the attack, typically only a few 
months before it occurs. This general progression is robust across types 
and scales of attacks and suggests that it might be used as an indication 
of the timing of possible future attacks.
Introduction
Do terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in their pre-attack activities? If 
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of imminent terrorist activity?  More specifi cally, can we use these indications and 
warnings to predict the timing of a future terrorist attack?
To answer these questions, this study will fi rst divide the terrorists’ pre-attack 
activities into nine phases: networking, training, general planning, attack-specifi c 
recruitment, fi nancing, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical 
preparation, and operational preparation. With these phases in mind, we will then 
examine a range of terrorism events and identify when each of these phases occurred. 
Some of the events that will be studied will include attacks on the USS Cole, 
September 11, the LAX airport, Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, the Limburg oil tanker, 
the USS Sullivans, the embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the USS Kearsage.  
These cases provide variation across multiple dimensions; some are small, while 
others are large; some are maritime attacks, while others are on land or from the air; 
some occur in the Middle East, while others occur in Asia, Europe, and the U.S. 
All these variations in cases will allow us to assess the overall pattern of terrorist 
planning activities, but will also allow us to break the cases apart and see if there are 
differences according to the type of attack.  
Our goal is to determine if there is a general timeframe in which each phase 
occurs. For example, if terrorist fi nancing usually occurs three to six months before 
an attack, this will provide a valuable warning to intelligence analysts and will 
have different ramifi cations than if it occurred two to three days before an attack. 
If fi nancing and other activities occur a short time before an attack, then a policy 
of arresting those suspected of plotting an attack as soon as their activity is noticed 
would make sense, since activities and attacks nearly coincide. On the other hand, 
if fi nancing and other preparatory activities take place typically months before an 
attack then letting these activities continue, in hopes of catching more accomplices, 
might be a reasonable risk to take. In addition, if most attacks have a long preparatory 
phase, then it increases the likelihood that individuals planning terrorist attacks might 
come to the attention of citizens and police offi cers engaged in routine activities. In 
this case, it would make sense to increase public awareness campaigns, as well as 
briefi ngs to patrol offi cers and others, such as fi re and public health personnel, whose 
routine activities might bring them into contact with individuals preparing attacks.  
Finally, we will be able to assess the general ordering of these phases. Does each 
phase usually occur in some sequential pattern or does their order change for each 
attack? For example, if fi nancing activities are observed, should intelligence analysts 
next look for evidence of weapons procurement or attack-specifi c recruitment or 
something else? 
This paper will fi rst describe the operational phases and how they are coded. 
Next, we will analyse the data to see if any patterns emerge. Our discussion will focus 
on the overall pattern, as well as how different subsets of the cases have different 
or similar patterns. Finally, this paper will address how this research can be used to 
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we can predict (with some confi dence) the timing of unrealized terrorist attacks, 
specifi cally the Fort Dix and JFK airport plots.
Phases of terrorist activity
Before a terrorist attack occurs, several other things must occur. The individuals 
involved must join the group, get trained, plan the attack, acquire fi nances, weapons, 
and other material, and make fi nal preparations or rehearsals for the fi nal attack. We 
have created nine different phases that incorporate these activities. Each phase is 
meant to be as distinct as possible. We recognize, however, that some may overlap or 
be hard to differentiate when coding actual cases. The phases of pre-attack activity are:
(1) Networking and Indoctrination: The introduction of cell members and 
exposure to radical doctrine through events such as religious instruction, cohabitation, 
meetings, and social activities.
(2) Terrorist Training: The participation of cell members in organized terrorist 
training activities (often overlaps with 1).
(3) General Planning: The decision to conduct a terrorist attack and choice of a 
general target area or target set (i.e. ships, bars, Americans, soldiers, etc.). Phase also 
includes general “shopping” for potential targets.
(4) Recruitment: The selection or the activation of cell members for a specifi c 
terrorist operation by more senior terrorist elements. This assumes that there is a 
senior element, as there was in the 9-11 attack, which helps with recruitment and 
selection of personnel. In a group like the one that carried out the attacks on the 
London mass transit system in July 2005, this may not be the case. Yet, in groups 
like that a process of recruitment and selection still occurs, as pre-existing groups 
of friends and acquaintances go through the process of radicalisation that ultimately 
results in a group committed to an attack. 
(5) Financing: The collection and allocation of funds for a specifi c terrorist 
attack. Sometimes, as with the group that carried out the attack on the USS Cole, the 
money comes before the decision to conduct an attack is made.  
(6) Operational Planning: The selection of the specifi c target, detailed 
reconnaissance of the target, and specifi c planning for operation (delivery method, 
procurement methods, etc.).
(7) Weapons Procurement: The procurement or receipt of materials for the 
construction of explosives or weapons used in the attack itself (fertilizer, rockets, 
detonators, accelerant, etc.).
(8) Logistical Preparation: Logistical actions taken in preparation for the terrorist 
attack including safe house rental, vehicle procurement, document procurement, 
electronics purchase, etc.).
(9) Operational Preparation: Physical Preparations for the imminent terrorist 
attack including explosives construction, vehicle alteration, specifi c explosives 
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Emergent patterns
We examined and coded twenty-one cases of terrorist attacks and two attacks that 
are not typically counted as terrorist attacks (Columbine and Virginia Tech), since 
they were not carried out for political reasons. We have included them only to see if 
any patterns in terrorist attacks also occur in non-terrorist attacks that required some 
planning. For each case we looked for evidence of when the terrorists (or attackers) 
engaged in activities across the nine phases. The cases were:  
• The Achille Lauro Hijacking – 1985 
• The World Trade Center Bombing – 1993
• The Oklahoma City Bombing – 1995
• The Khobar Towers Bombing – 1996
• The Dar al Islam, Nairobi AQ Bombings – 1998
• The Columbine Shooting – 1999
• The LAX Millennium Plot – 2000
• The USS Sullivans Attack – 2000 
• The USS Cole Bombing – 2000
• The September 11 Attacks – 2001
• The Richard Reid Failed Attack – 2001
• The MV Limburg Bombing – 2002
• The Dubrovka Theater Siege, Moscow – 2002
• The Bali I Bombings – 2002
• The Jakarta Marriott Bombing – 2003
• The Madrid Train Bombings – 2004
• The Australia Embassy (Indonesia) Bombing – 2004
• The USS Kearsarge Attack – 2005
• The Bali II Bombings – 2005
• The London Subway Attack – 2005
• Fort Dix Plot – 2007
• JFK Airport Plot – 2007
• The Virginia Tech Shooting – 2007
These cases were not chosen randomly, and so any conclusions must be read as 
only tentative. In fact, the cases were chosen based on two criteria. First, we chose 
cases for which we expected to be able to gather data on the different phases. Second, 
we intentionally added cases to get as much variation as possible, but this variation 
may not occur in the same proportions in the overall universe of cases as it does in 
our dataset. For example, we chose ‘big’ cases like the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid train 
bombings, and others that we would expect to require more planning, but also smaller 
attacks like the LAX Millennium plot and the Richard Reid failed attack, which 
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as attacks by other groups. We included maritime terrorist attacks (Cole, Sullivans, 
Limburg), and non-maritime attacks. We included cases of not just successful attacks, 
but also ones that failed (Sullivans, Richard Reid, LAX), and ones that were thwarted 
(Fort Dix and JFK airport). The purpose of intentionally including cases of different 
types was to allow us to be able to break these cases apart and see if they fi t the larger, 
overall patterns.  
For all the cases, there are issues of missing or incomplete data. For example, we 
know that the Limburg attackers received a few infusions of cash before the attack. 
However, because we do not have a fi rm date for these events, we could not include 
this information in our dataset. Consequently, for any single case, we cannot plot 
the timing of all the activities by phase that we know must have occurred before the 
attack.  
With these issues in mind, we plotted the data on the graph below (Figure 1).
Figure 2 takes the same data and shows a bracket for each phase. The center of 
the bracket is the mean and the edges are two standard deviations from the mean.   
Figure 2 suggests that the nine phases we identifi ed fall into three stages. 
Beginning with the phases most remote from the attack, we might say that our 
sample shows that Stage I consists of phases 1-3 (planning, training and networking) 
and takes place a year or more in advance of the attacks. Stage II, (phases 4 and 
5: recruitment and fi nancing), takes place six months to a year or so in advance of 
an attack. Finally, Stage III consists of phases 6-9 (operational planning, weapons 
procurement, logistical preparation, and operational preparation) occur closest to the 
attack, typically only a few months before it occurs.
Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 present the data in a similar way, except they only include 
smaller subsets of the data (al-Qaeda attacks in Figures 3 and 4, and maritime attacks 
in Figures 5 and 6).
In terms of patterns that emerge, we must fi rst re-iterate that the limited number 
of cases and their non-random selection urge caution in interpreting the results of 
the research. As a generalisation, we can say that the phases and stages follow in 
what might be described as an operationally logical pattern. Recruiting and building 
general operational capabilities occurs fi rst, often months and even years in advance 
of a particular operation. Operational phases connected to a specifi c operation take 
place closer to the event, usually months, but sometimes only weeks or days before the 
attack. Sometimes a triggering event unconnected or at least not directly connected to 
the individuals preparing for attacks (an arrest or political event, for example) leads 
the terrorists to launch an operation that they have been planning.
The pattern for all of the cases also held up for subsets of the data. For instance, 
as Figures 3-6 show, al-Qaeda attacks and maritime attacks were fairly consistent 
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Figure 1 – Successful terrorist attacks  
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Figure 3 – Al-Qaeda attacks
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Figure 5 – Maritime terrorist attacks
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Although a general pattern emerged, we could not identify any critical 
pathways. The phases did not always occur according to the general pattern. While 
there is a general logic to the ordering of the phases, there is no reason to expect 
that they must necessarily be in the same order for all cases. Also, if a group had 
carried out a previous attack, then the pattern was foreshortened because the group 
had already built its capability and so lead times before an attack could be shorter. 
Of the twenty-three cases we examined, eight were second or later attacks by the 
same group (Achille Lauro, Cole, Limburg, Kearsage, Dubrovka, Marriott Hotel, 
Australian Embassy, Bali 2005). As we should expect, in these cases the preparatory 
phases are shortened. Still, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical 
preparation, and operational preparation, what we called above Stage III, occurred 
several months before the attack and sometimes ten to twelve months before.
Indications and warnings
While understanding the general pattern of preparation before a terrorist attack is 
useful, it would be most valuable if it could be used as an indicator of an upcoming 
attack. Specifi cally, if we assume that a terrorist plot follows the larger pattern (and 
this is admittedly a big and perhaps problematic assumption), can we predict when 
the attack itself is likely to occur? In our dataset, we have two cases of pre-empted 
attacks – the Fort Dix plot and the JFK Airport plot, both in 2007 – that offer a test 
of this proposition. Because the plotters were arrested before an attack could take
place, we could not plot them on the same scale as the other attacks (where the x 
axis is time before the attack). Instead, the events are plotted chronologically. Both 
of these cases (to the time arrests put an end to them) fi t within the overall pattern 
developed from the other attacks. In fact, based on the overall patterns found in other 
cases, we could estimate that the attacks would likely have occurred 2-4 months or 
so after the plotters were arrested. Figure 7 shows the JFK plot and Figure 8 shows 
the Fort Dix plot.
From a practical standpoint, there are several challenges to fi nding indications 
and warnings of future terrorist attacks. For example, some of the activities described 
in this paper may occur without having any ties to terrorist activity or terrorist 
groups. Also, some activities might not be observable to intelligence agencies. 
To be able to better judge the quality of indicators, Greg Treverton proposes that 
potential indicators be evaluated according to their uniqueness and visibility.1 
Unique indicators of terrorism are those that cannot be explained by other types 
of activities. For our purposes, weapons procurement and operational preparation 
(constructing the bomb, altering the vehicle, making a martyr video) are probably the 
most unique because there would be few reasons for non-terrorists to engage in these 
acts. Other activities, such as fi nancial fl ows and logistical preparation (e.g. renting a
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Figure 7 – The JFK plot
Figure 8 – The Fort Dix plot
storage unit), are less unique because they might be done by people uninvolved
with terrorism. Visible indicators are those that are easily observed by security 
forces (law enforcement, military, intelligence). Among our phases, attack-specifi c 






































Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. Volume 5, Number 1, 2010. 85
borders (e.g. the 1998 embassies bombings), fi nancing may be visible if funds are 
moved through the formal banking system, weapons procurement may be visible 
if the purchase of explosives and precursor materials is monitored, and logistical 
preparation may be visible because activities like vehicle and safe house purchases 
are often in the public record. Of course, indicators that are both visible and unique 
are the best, but this does not often occur. Nevertheless, Treverton’s criteria are useful 
for evaluating the relative merits of the different phases as possible indicators of 
future attacks.
Conclusion
In sum, we have collected data on twenty-three different attacks and coded the 
information on their pre-attack activities according to our nine phases. We have found 
that the cases follow a general pattern, yet there are outliers to the pattern. In general, 
however, the three overall stages we identifi ed do seem to represent a necessary order. 
Some broad plan, along with networking and general training (Stage I) occur usually 
more than a year before an attack and are necessary before recruiting and fi nancing 
(Stage II) can occur, which usually happens between six months and a year before an 
attack. Finally, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation, 
and operational preparation (Stage III) occur closest to the attack, typically only a 
few months before it occurs. This general staging is robust across types and scales of 
attacks and suggests that it might be used as an indication of the timing of possible 
future attacks. 
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